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 This paper will give an overview of economic anthropology both in terms of the 
history of ideas and the philosophy of science.  It will look at how the field has developed 
from several distinct philosophies in economics to the multifaceted approaches within the 
field today.  The first section will look at the roots of the field and the major philosophies 
and proponents of those philosophies.  The second section will look at the more recent 
trends in terms of how they draw on the earlier philosophies and the new elements they 
incorporate.  The final section will look at how the multifaceted approaches in the field 
has allowed for new avenues of study.  In particular, this section will look how these 








Recent trends in economic anthropology have started to branch out from the 
traditional schools of thought and paradigms.  Anthropologists are now finding that the 
formerly rigid distinctions between the various schools are more flexible than previously 
thought.  The work of a given anthropologist’s may fit more within a specific approach, 
but his work will also reflect the influence of several other approaches as well.  This has 
opened up new avenues of study in formerly ignored areas.   
Take the definition of the homo economicus, or the “economic man.”  The idea 
(as I will discuss later) is that all actions and decisions made by man are made with the 
goal of maximizingi his satisfaction.  However, this definition has only recently been 
applied to non-industrial, non-western societies.  Originally, it applied solely to material 
gain based on an institutional economy.  I hope to show how such areas as this can now 
be analyzed through a study of the history of ideas and the philosophy of science, which 
have governed economic anthropology.   
Accordingly, this paper will look first at the roots of economic anthropology.  It 
will then look at the formalist, substantivist, and Marxist schools and the institutional, 
formal, and ecological paradigms (Halperin 1988:7).  It will focus on how the field has 
grown and changed from conventional economics to the multifaceted approach it is 
today.  It will then look at how this multifaceted approach has encouraged the broadening 









Roots of Economics 
The study of economics within the social sciences originated in the field of 
economics and sought to create explanations for the “patterns and variations” observed 
throughout all societies (Halperin 1988: 1).  The roots of economics lie in the writings of 
philosophers like Aristotle and in the concept of the household as the basic economic unit 
(Wilkii 2007).  It was not until the seventeenth century that the economy was considered 
a “separate entity” from the basic unit of the household, when production of goods 
outside the home increased and exploration of the New World began.   
Thus the study of economics derived from questions on the nature of human 
beings posed by the philosophers of the day such as are humans essentially good or evil? 
Economic theorists like Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), John Locke (1632-1704) and 
Jean Jacques-Rousseau (1712-1778)iii asked questions about the nature of human 
behavior.  Do people naturally behave “selfishly” or “altruistically” (Wilk 2007: 40)? 
People can behave in either fashion; the question posed by early philosophers is whether 
people are naturally prone to one or the other.  Hobbes and Rousseau exalted 
“primitiveiv” peoples because they represented the “natural state” of man (41) in the 
hierarchy of civilization.  The flow of goods from one person to another was embedded in 
the norms of their societies.  Hobbes and Locke saw the motives for this as essentially 
selfish, whereas Rousseau saw them as being more altruistic. 
Later theorists like Adam Smith sided with Hobbes and Locke, seeing human 
beings as inherently selfish (Wilk 2007: 41; Stuart 2010).  Smith explained the 
embeddedness of human behavior in terms of a moral economy that qualified its self-






characteristic of the tribal economy, where “in spite of their natural selfishness,” peoples 
“divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements.”  An “invisible hand” leads 
these actions, which, unbeknownst to the actor, “advance[s] the interest of the society” 
(Smith 1759: 630).  Exchanges based on moral obligations to kinship relations and rituals 
are examples of the types of activities guided by the “invisible hand” (Stuart 2010)v.   
 
Early Economic Anthropology 
Others like Max Weber and Emil Durkheim agreed with the concept of a moral 
economy but rejected the notion of human beings as inherently selfish and focused 
instead on their “social nature” (Wilk 2007: 41).  Weber relied more on the individual’s 
ability to influence the larger group based on their “moral imagination” (41).  The 
cosmology and the institution in which they are raised instill these morals in themvi and 
thus also their behavior.  Durkheim, on the other hand, stressed that while people “think 
and feel” as individuals, when looked at as part of the larger whole of society, they fall 
into groups.  Their behavior changes according to the pressures of the group and their 
desire to conformvii (41).  To early economic anthropologists, the degree of 
embeddedness of the economy was directly proportional to how technologically 
advanced the society wasviii.  Tribal societies were at the bottom of this evolutionary-
based hierarchy of civilizations, and European and Western economies were at the top.  
Sociologists like Weber and Durkheim worked in tribal societies and saw that the 
economy was intricately tied in with the culture’s mores and norms in what was termed 






Bronislaw Malinowski also worked in tribal societies, primarily the Trobriand 
islanders, looking at how the economy was embedded in the social environment of the 
society.  According to his student Firth (see Appendix 1), Malinowski showed how 
economic activity is socially motivated and can have complex dimensions depending on 
the cosmology of the group (1964: 209-228).  For example, he showed how with the 
Trobriand islanders the “magic practices served a positive function in the economic 
system by instilling confidence and hope in the individual who was setting out on a 
trading expedition” (LeClair and Schneider 1968: 4).  Malinowski had little regard for 
economic theory.  In response to this, economic anthropologists like Melville Herskovits 
and his student Raymond Firth described a new economic anthropology that trumpeted 
the benefits of economic theory. 
Herskovits and Firth emphasized the “calculus of maximization” of people’s 
actions (LeClair and Schneider 1968: 6).  According to this theory, people rationally 
make choices according to a set of “determinable” principles (6).  These principles could 
relate to the satisfaction of the individual or to their moral imagination.   Thus while 
economists viewed the economy as isolated from the social system, economic 
anthropologists like Herskovits and Firth acknowledged the social system’s effect on the 
economy of a society.  The work of Malinowski, Firthx and Herskovits rooted the idea of 
the embeddedness of the economy firmly in the field of economic anthropology and in 
the substantivist and Marxist schools of thought.  This would be challenged by the formal 
and institutional paradigms in anthropology that analyzed the disembedded nature of the 










The differentiation between an embedded and a disembedded economy as well as 
Weber’s writings on the difference between the formalist and substantivist definitions of 
the economy contributed to the formalist-substantivist debatexi (Nash 1965: 123).  
Formalists like Raymond Firth and Marvin Harris argued for an empirically based 
paradigm.  They believed that formal economic theory could be applied cross-culturallyxii 
and emphasized the self-interested model of human behavior.  Drawing on Smith, 
formalists saw that individuals make pragmatic choices to maximizexiii their own 
satisfaction according to the labor theory of value (Stuart 2010; Polanyi 1953 as reprinted 
in Fried 1959, 166; Halperin 1988: 10).  In Polanyi’s terms, the formal meaning of 
“economic” is based in the logic of a “means-end relationship” (Polanyi 1953 as 
reprinted in Fried 1959, 162).  The laws of supply and demand determine what the price 




Figure 1 – The Law of Supply and Demand, Shown in Equilibrium 
 
 
In this exchange of goods (as Polanyi calls the market economy) there is no social 
component.  The price of an object is solely determined based on what the market will 
bear.  In the graph above, the price of the object α is where the lines of supply and 
demand cross.  An individual who predicts what a market can sustain determines the 
price, not what society requires the price to be according to interpersonal relationships.  
The unit of analysis, then, is on the level of the individual.   
The substantivists, on the other hand, rejected formal economic theory, saying 
that, as it focused on the market mechanism, it could only apply to capitalistic societies 
(Stuart 2010).  Polanyi in The Great Transformation argued that the modern economy of 
Nineteenth Century Europe was “disembedded” from the social structure.  This created a 
market that was driven solely by economic considerations (Humphreys 1969: 166-167).  
In non-market societies, by contrast, Polanyi argued that “the economy cannot be 











The economy is too embedded in the social structure to be analyzed using the same 
theories that apply to capitalistic societies.  The social structure thus defined the type of 
theory that could be applied and what type of economy would exist.  The unit of analysis 
could only be the institutions, since it depended on interpersonal relationships.   
In the tribal societies Polanyi studied, the economy is characterized by what he 
terms reciprocity (what Marshall Sahlins called general reciprocity).  Their social 
structure was defined by gift giving or by “movements between correlative points of 
symmetrical groupings in society” (Polanyi 1944: 63-64).  Along those lines, he 
suggested four overall patterns of economic activity based on social structure: reciprocity, 
redistribution, exchange, and householding.  These came to be associated with an 
evolutionary hierarchy of civilization in anthropology so that reciprocity was seen as the 
lowest level and exchange the highest. The table below summarizes the formalist and 
substantivist positions in the debate. 
 
 Formalist Substantivist 
Major Players Scott Cook George Dalton, Karl Polanyi 
Ontology The economy is not 
embedded in the society.  It 
is a separate entity. 
The economy is embedded in 
society. 
Epistemology The economy utilizes a 
market mechanism.  
Society is the central 
reference for the economy. 
Not all markets utilize a market 
mechanism.  The family is at the 







Methodology Deductive method: 
• Derives from logic 
• Set of rules 
referring to choice 
between alternative 
uses of insufficient 
means 
• Power of syllogism 
• Laws of mind 
(Cook 1966: 332) 
Inductive Method: 
• Derives from fact 
• Implies neither choice nor 
insufficiency of means 
• Power of gravity (as an 
empirical reality) 
• Law of Nature 
(Cook 1966: 332) 
Figure 2 – Summary table of Formalist-Substantivist debate 
 
After the formalist-substantivist debate, the approaches and paradigms of economic 
anthropology became increasingly interrelated  The paradigms, according to Halperin, 
may have developed out of these schools of thought, but the controversies between 
schools grew out of the “underlying theoretical frames” of the paradigms (1988: 7-8).  As 
such, schools may be associated with a number of paradigms and vice versa.  The 
institutional, formal, and ecological paradigms and the schools of thought that are 
associated with them are all interrelated.  Where they differ is in which elements of the 
roots of the field on which they draw.  The most recent approaches, like practice theory 
and rational choice theory, as will be discussed later, include elements from both the 
schools below and new schools. 
 
The Institutional Paradigm 
The institutional paradigm consists of models that emphasize the role of 
institutional “arrangements of organizing production, distribution, and consumption.” 
(Halperin 1988: 31).  This paradigm is considered to be substantivist in approach and a 






Veblen is considered the father of the institutional paradigm, though it also incorporates 
ideas from Max Weber and Karl Marx.  Weber and Marx contributed through their 
theories that the economy functions based on the institution (Halperin 1988: 55). As 
intellectual descendants of Veblen, Bronislaw Malinowski, Karl Polanyi, and Raymond 
Firth (See Appendix A) also contributed to the development of the paradigm. There are 
several schools of thought that are associated with the institutional paradigm and which 
derive many of their theoretical positions from the aforementioned ontological and 
epistemological statements.  The Marxist, feminist, and substantivist schools of thought 
are the most closely associated. 
First Marx and then Polanyi in their writings formulated the ontological and 
epistemological foundations of the institutional paradigm.  The basic assumption of the 
institutional paradigm is that “empirical economies do not exist apart from the institutions 
that organise [sic] them” (Halperin 1988:45).  In other words, the economy in all societies 
is embedded in the society.  It consists of a process of material provisioning of livelihood 
where the economic systems grow out of specific historical and institutional conditions.  
These conditions, they postulated, can be explained neither by positing universal 
psychological traits nor by invoking the “universal logic of rational action” (Halperin 
1988:40).   
Yet there were points on which Polanyi did not follow Marx.  For example, Marx 
expanded on the primary ontological statements by saying that all distribution processes 
in an economy share common characteristics that are the result of specific historical and 
institutional conditions (Marx 1973).  Polanyi, on the other hand, had more occasions to 






process of interaction serving the distribution of material wants” (Polanyi 1977:31).  
Marxist, feminist, and substantivist economic anthropology derive their specific 
approaches from these ideas and expand on them to suit their own purposes.  To achieve 
this result Polanyi advocated a method that combined thought and experience (Polanyi 
1977: liv-lv).  That is to say, a person must incorporate the policy and ethnography of a 
study (the experience) with the theory and history (the thought) of it as well.  The table 
below summarizes the main concepts of the institutional paradigm and how it relates to 
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Marxism 
Political Economy 








Eric Wolf  
Ontology The economy in 




livelihood.  This is 
an instituted 
process that serves 
to satisfy material 
wants. 
The economy is 
affected by social 
change. 
The economy is at the 







Epistemology Patterns and trends 
are discernable 
from the economy.  
These can be 





every aspect of a 
society, creating a 
new blended 
economy. 
The economy can be 
subdivided into 




Methodology Analysis of market 
on two levels: 
General and 
particular 
Based on the ideal 
mode of 







• Means of 
production 
Looked at the 
economy on a holistic 
(general) level.  




Figure 3 – Summary Table for the institutional paradigm compared to structural 
Marxism, and political economy. 
 
The Marxist School of Thought 
The Marxist school of thought in economic anthropology agrees with the 
ontological and epistemological statements of Marx and Polanyi above, though its focus 
in the 1970s took a different angle on Marx’s original writings.  In this sense, the Marxist 
school of the 1970s can be considered more of a “neo”xiv Marxist approach.  Within this 
neo-Marxist approach there are many directions that competed, including “structural 
Marxism, semiotic Marxism, feminist Marxism, hermeneutical Marxism, 
phenomenological Marxism and critical Marxism, and so on” (Jacoby 1981:1).  Any neo-
Marxist approach looks to define a “formal” economy as an “ideal” onexv.  That is to say 
that any analysis of the economy would not only study how products were converted into 






would also look at the historical context of the “observed distribution” for patterns of 
change over time (Plattner 1989:16-17). 
Structural Marxism and political economy, or as Firth called them “cerebral 
Marxism” and “gut Marxism”(Firth 1972, 1975; compare Roseberry 1973: 161), were the 
two approaches within the Marxist school of thought that came to the forefront in the mid 
1970s.  As will be discussed below, the French and British schools of economic 
anthropology developed and advocated the structural Marxist approach.  The American 
school of anthropology, on the other hand, favored a renewal of Marx’s idea of the 
political economy.   
 
Structural Marxism 
Writers like Louis Althusser, Étienne Balibar, and Claude Lévi-Strauss’s 
contributions to the development of structural Marxism in the 1950s and 1960s revolved 
around looking at the deeper structures and functions of society to analyze the economic 
actions of its participants (Hart 1983: 123; Eriksen 2001: 116).  Their method of analysis 
was based on the “ideal mode of production,” which had three elements: “producers, non-
producers and means of production—whose variable combination was realized as 
concrete modes of production” (Balibar 1970 in Hart 1983: 123).   
Althusser and Balibar are considered to be the main influences in the French 
school of structural Marxism.  They were influenced by Marx’s early writings on the 
“mode of production” and wrote as a reaction to humanist Marxism (Althusser 1965: 11).  
They tended to focus on capitalism, especially in the colonial era.  According to 






their purposes while retaining elements of the original structure (Wilk 2007: 107).  The 
same processes that affected the social structure would affect the economy.  Meillassoux, 
an intellectual descendant of Althusser and Balibar, demonstrated this with the case of 
West Africa.  The economic and social systems did not completely transform under 
colonial rule.  Rather, capitalism adopted the “pre-capitalist” modes of production into its 
system.  The end result was that capitalism is dominant, and the other modes of 
production were “determined by the way they articulate with capitalism” (Binford and 
Cook 1991; Wilk 2007: 107).   
The British school of structuralism was less influential in structural Marxism than 
the French school.  Claude Lévi-Strauss, the main anthropologist behind structural 
functionalism, was also the primary influence behind the British school of structural 
Marxism.  His goal was to be able to look at society as a whole through various “units” 
like kinship and be able to predict the behavior of the group as a whole using common 
properties (Wilk 2007:105; Leach 1970).  Most of his work revolved around kinship 
systems, particularly in comparison with the studies of Alfred Radcliffe-Browne, the 
other main proponent of structural functionalism.  As a whole, structural functionalism 
was more concerned with deriving the units in a society and finding the “laws” that 
connected them than it was with looking at the individual units, like the economyxvi. 
In the 1970s, the “descendants” of Althusser and Lévi-Strauss, Claude 
Meillassouxxvii and Maurice Godélier, focused more specifically on structures and modes 
of production within an economy.  For Meillassoux, the main task was to “extricate 
economics from kinship” (Eriksen 2001: 114).  His proposed solution was to look at 






family and the household” (Eriksen 2001: 114; see Meillassoux 1975, 1981).  
Meillassoux wanted to look at the economy as it was embedded in social relations, but 
not in a functionalist sense, which would look at it with a “legalistic empiricism” rather 
than a thorough analysis (Meillassoux 1981: iii).  Much of this was based on his study of 
the cultural groups in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the Guro (See Meillassoux 1964).   
Similarly, Godélier, who studied the Baruya in New Guinea, focused on the 
relation of kinship systems to the economy.  His analysis of how salt functioned within 
their society (see Godélier 1971) showed that it played not only an economic role, but 
also religious, political, and symbolic roles in the society, especially in relation to kinship 
(Plattner 1989:390).  Proponents of the notion of the political economy did not take an 
opposing position to the work of Meillassoux and Godélier; rather, they worked from a 





Where the structural Marxists tended to focus on pre-industrial societies, the 
political economy approach was focused more on the impact of “capitalism” 
(Clammer1985: 8; Ortner 1984: 141).  It was concerned with long-term change and took 
a more holistic approach to the study of the economy.  The divisions of economic 
systems into historical types allowed a broader cross-cultural comparison than the 
structural Marxist approach and brought issues of exploitation, inequality, and conflict to 






Eric Wolf was one of the most influential proponents of political economy.  In 
part, his work was influenced by Marx’s notion of political economy and Julian 
Steward’s concept of cultural ecology (which will be discussed later). Yet his work 
mostly developed from Raymond Firth’s examination of the symbolic nature of people’s 
actions in terms of their effects on the economy.  Where Firth examines this on the level 
of individual gestures and wonders if “each gesture” holds some “hidden meaning” 
(1957: 2 in Berliner 1962: 47), Wolf looks at larger units of analysis.   Wolf was more 
interested in “how the destinies of localities are intertwined with large-scale processes.”  
More often than not, Wolf argued, “the engine of these processes is economic profit, and 
the result is capital accumulation in the centre and exploitation in the periphery” (Eriksen 
2001:119).  His book Peasants (1964) demonstrates this by examining the role of 
peasants in Mexico in the overall economy of the country.  They are the victims of 
economic exploitation, and as such the economic and political actions of the larger 
society determine their behavior (Eriksen 2001: 119; Wolf 1956). 
Anthropologists that advocated this approach in the 1970s tended to agree that 
people in general were social.  As such, they identify with a group and are motivated by 
“the interests of the collectivity” (Wilk 2007: 42).  In order to study the behavior of 
people and its impact on capitalism, one must study “the norms and the solidarity and 
continuity of the group rather than individual self-interest” (Wilk 2007:43).  Often times 
this tied into the work of development anthropology and its use of dependency and world 
systems theory.  
At this time in history (1970s-80s), the notion of the political economy as 






field kit, particularly since social scientists had begun to engage in development issues on 
a far larger scale than ever before” (Eriksen 2001: 119). Both the approach of political 
economy and that of development anthropology in the institutional paradigm drew on 
dependency and world systems theory.  Dependency theory is a reaction against the 
“modernization” theory of the 1950s; it was developed by economists and historians 
associated with the Economic Commission on Latin America (Wilk 2007: 107).  The 
“modernization miracle” of the 1950s claimed that there was a “single road from 
primitive to modern, a pathway of economic change that each country had to follow” 
(Wilk 2007: 107-108).  The economists in the post-World War II era thought that, 
through a process of acculturation, every country could “follow in the footsteps of the 




Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory 
Dependency theorists like Paul Baran and Andre Gunder Frank exposed the 
significant problems with modernization theory.  Baran argued that “modern” countries 
actually achieved that status by exploiting the raw materials and natural resources in the 
Third World (Wilk 2007: 108; Baran 1957).  Frank applied Baran’s argument to Latin 
America and expanded it to look at the role of dualism in it.  He argued that dualism, or 
“the gradual evolution of the primitive into the modern” was only an illusion.  Those 






which were “made that way [sic]” by colonialism and capitalism (Wilk 2007: 108; See 
Frank 1967, 1969).   
Very related to dependency theory was Immanuel Wallerstein’s world systems 
theory.  He saw the history of interaction in the world as cycles of expansion and collapse 
of economic systems.  He explained that “all the modern world’s wars, battles, and 
conquests, as well as the world’s cultures and political systems, were tied together by the 
logic of trade and production” (Wilk 2007: 109).  Thus when one of the more powerful 
economies collapses, a chain reaction occurs throughout the rest of the system and affects 
all other economies connected directly or indirectly to it (See Chase-Dun and Hall 1991). 
Dependency theorists and world systems theorists had to study the histories of the 
people and their economic institutions.  In this way they were as much concerned with 
the long-term as political economy theorists.  Yet this created a problem in the type of 
methodology used.  If a thorough study of the development of an economy is necessary, 
then one person doing fieldwork for one year will not be able to see any long-term 
changes.  This led to a more collaborative approach to fieldwork among economic 
anthropologists as well as an increase in the use of formal methods (Dalton 1971: 279). 
Critics of this method argue that there are fundamental problems within 
development anthropology as a whole that make much of the work problematic.  Some 
take issue with the assumption that the definition of “development” requires a change in 
the structure of a society (See Schneider 1975: 273).  Others look at the division of the 
world into “core” and “periphery” as only a “partial deconstruction” of dualist 
anthropology, which are permutations of the “traditional” versus “modern” and “self” 






the assumption that people in underdeveloped areas are essentially “rational peasants” 
(otherwise known as the “economic man”) or “non-materialistic and otherworldly” (Blair 
1971: 353).  The development approach to economics looks at both the historical and 
institutional aspects of economic systems and tries to analyze them using formal 
methods.  It is an approach that, like many, fits both into the institutional paradigm and 
the formal paradigm, the latter of which will be discussed below. See table below for how 





















Ontology The economy in 




livelihood.  This is 
an instituted 
process that serves 
to satisfy material 
wants. 
The economy of a 
country is a central 
component of its 
world status. 
The history of the 
world is a continuous 








Epistemology Patterns and trends 
are discernable 
from the economy.  
These can be 






economies to boost 
their own and 
elevate their 
statuses. 
All wars and battles 
fought through 
history are connected 
through trade and 
production. 
Methodology Analysis of market 
on two levels: 
General and 
particular 
Analyze the market 
on the world 
(general) level, and 
on the individual 
level through 
ethnography. 
Analysis of the world 
economies on a large 
historical scale.  Only 
use general analysis. 




At its core the formalistxviii paradigm in economic anthropology is a 
methodological one.  It combines elements from the work of Adam Smith, Max Weber, 
and Karl Polanyi to create a framework for a method of “analysing [sic] data that may 
emphasize institution or ecological factors of economic organization, or both” (Halperin 
1988: 61).  From Smith, it takes the concept “that a market system would be created 
automatically by self-interested actors pursuing their aims” (Halperin 1988: 39).  From 
Weber, it draws on the concept of formal economic rationality, which is a culture’s 
ability to calculate or account for its economic activities quantitatively (Weber 1947: 
184-5).  This does not occur universally, but rather in specific contexts.  Weber argued 
for it primarily in state level societies with market economies based in capitalism.  
Finally, it incorporated Polanyi’s definition of economics as the “logic of rational choice-






Proponents of the paradigm range from Marxist anthropologists to ecological 
anthropologists.  The rational choice theory used by recent economic anthropologists had 
its start in the formal paradigm, as will be discussed later.  Some, like Raymond Firth and 
Melville Herskovits, took the basic aim of the paradigm and tried to incorporate 
conventional economics into it.  For example, in Themes in Economic Anthropology, 
editor Raymond Firth claims that “primitive” economics requires an “analysis of material 
from uncivilized communities” so that said material can be “directly comparable with the 
material of modern economics.”  This will allow “generalizations to be ultimately framed 
which will subsume the phenomena of both civilized and uncivilized...communities into a 
body of principles about human behavior which will be truly universal” (Firth 1939:29 
cited in LeClair 1962:1187).  Similarly, Herskovits’ concept of “rational and 
economizing behavior” in his book Economic Anthropology (1952) incorporates neo-
classical economic theory.   
Formal economic anthropologists focused on the process of building a model 
rather than focusing on creating universals as many other paradigms did.  They assumed 
that people’s economic actions become a universal activity (Halperin 1988:66-70), and so 
those actions will tend to maximize their satisfaction (Herskovitsxix 1952:18).  As a 
result, the decision-making found on the individual level can explain the operating 
system as a whole (Salisbury 1973: 91).  The methodology they proposed allowed them 
to study the process of model building and was adopted by many other approaches (like 
development and ecological anthropology).  It involved “establishing a series of 
expectations postulated under known or assumed conditions and then comparing these 






models used by formal economic anthropologists are atomistic and processual models 
(See Halperin 1988: 78-79)  
Polanyi’s “formalxx” approach (as contrasted to his substantivist approach) is an 
example of an approach that utilizes the formal paradigm almost in its entirety.  The 
formal approach assumes that all decisions are aimed at maximizing production 
(Salisbury 1973: 85).  That is to say that the choices people make are rational or 
economic.  It also tries to incorporate conventional economic models in its methodology 
(Wilk 2007: 8-16).  The unit of analysis in formal approach was a small community 
whose economic rationale could then be applied cross-culturally to others.  For example, 
David Martin Goodfellow applies the formalist economic theory to Bantu societies.  He 
suggests that the principles of economic theory regarding material production and 
consumption can be applied outside Western life by “fitting them to different forms” 
(Schneider 1974:15).  He illustrates this with a suggestion that the “value of brides 
fluctuates with the supply of grain; i.e., women constitute in Bantu society a labor 
market” (Goodfellow 1939:9 in Schneider 1974:15).  This type of economic activity 
could be studied cross-culturally according to Goodfellow.  The ecological paradigm, 
which also tends to also emphasize “quantitative techniques” (Dalton 1969: 65), uses a 










Ontology Scarcity is assumed to be a fact of all social life.  Individuals 
act economically by making choices about how to use their 
scarce resources to the best advantage.  The rational 
calculation of scare means toward alternate uses became a 
universal activity, something that derived from the very 
nature of being human. 
 
Epistemology On the whole, the individual tends to maximize his 
satisfactions in terms of the choices he makes. 
Methodology The process involves establishing a series of expectations 
postulated under known or assumed conditions and then 
comparing these expectations with empirical data. 
Figure 5 – Summary Table of Formalist Paradigm 
 
Ecological Paradigm 
The ecological paradigm in economic anthropology, like the institutional and 
formal paradigms, does not ignore the benefits of the others.  Similar to the institutional 
paradigm, the ecological paradigm in recent years has examined specific “micro-
processes” in a given society and analyzed their impacts.  Yet they do so with methods 
that are empirical and quantitatively based.  The paradigm grew out of the tradition of 
Franz Boas and the work of Julian Steward and Leslie White.  Both Steward and White 
followed Boas’ tradition of taking the “variation in social organization among different 
cultural groups” as their central issue and seeking the order and reason that would explain 
the variety found in “systems of kinship, leadership, and settlement among the world’s 
peoples”.  To both, “the key was to be found in the ways that people made a living, in 
their subsistence system [sic]” (Wilk 2007:  20).   This led to ecological models based 






1969: 65).  As such, it tended to consider economics in the “substantive” sense of 
“economic activities” (Wilk 2007: 21).   
More recently it has had an “affinity with the definition of the economic as an 
embedded process in society concerned mainly with provisioning (production and 
exchange)” (Gross 1983: 155).  It is interested in the “rationality of the system” or the 
“ecosystem” rather than the individuals (Wilk 2007: 21; Halperin 1988: 17).  Here the 
ecosystem is defined as “consisting of a set of interacting species of organisms and their 
physical environment” (Halperin 1988:17).  It is this ecosystem, which is often analyzed 
within an evolutionary framework, that is the unit of analysis within the paradigm 
(Dalton 1969: 65). 
The theory of the ecological paradigm is nomothetic and cross-cultural (though 
critics of the paradigm contest the cross-cultural ability of it.  See Halperin 1988:17-18).  
Proponents of the paradigm say that nature has an economy that is observable in the 
cultural arrangements to obtain dietary protein (Gross 1975 in Gross 1983: 160).  One 
explanation for this, according to ecologists, is that they maximize their “fitness,” 
meaning their “chances of making a genetic contribution to the next generation” (Wilk 
2007: 21-22).  Another is that ecologists look to divide the ecosystem into a core and 
periphery.  The core consists of “items which can be identified in any society” like “the 
physical and biotic environment, the tools and techniques available for using that 
environment, and the material transactions between the human population and the 
environment and among people themselves” (Gross 1983: 161).  Such cultural items as 
kinship and religion are relegated to epiphenomena (Godélier 1977; Friedman 1974 in 






ecological paradigm with its focus on shifting settlement patterns.  The table below 
summarizes the major concepts of the ecological paradigm. 
 
 Ecological  
Major Players Julian Steward and Leslie White 
Ontology • Society is a dynamic system of cultural 
change that are affected by the outside 
world.  
• Theory is nomothetic and cross-cultural.   
• Nature has an economy. 
 
Epistemology • People “maximize” their fitness by 
selecting carefully to make their genetic 
contribution to the next generation. 
• Religion and kinship are epiphenomenal. 
Methodology • Uses quantitative techniques 
Figure 6 – Summary table for the ecological paradigm. 
 
As can be seen, the three overall paradigms of economic anthropology do not 
exist independently from each other.  Rather, an anthropologist who works in one 
paradigm may pull from another when it best suits his interests.  The most multifaceted 
and cross-cultural approaches to develop recently in economic anthropology are the 
feminist school of thought and practice theory.  
 
Feminist School 
The feminist school of thought is most closely associated with the institutional 
paradigm, though it is more generally a subtype of gender studies and can be applied to 






of a modern patriarchy that tends to define women out of positions of power and control” 
(Wilk 2007: 17).   The roots of this philosophy lie in the Greek word “oikos” meaning 
“house,” from which the word “economy” is derived (17).  The management of the 
household was considered economics, which was controlled by the male head of the 
house.  As was discussed at the beginning of this paper, it was not until the seventeenth 
century that the separation of “public” from “private” separated the notion of the 
economy from the household.  At this point, the domestic or private sphere was relegated 
to the women, while the economic or public sphere remained in the hands of the men. 
  The feminist paradigm is also related to the idea of a dualist economy, where 
actions that are considered economic fall on the male side, and non-economic actions fall 
on the women’s side (Wilk 2007: 17).  As this dualism affects all societies, including the 
Western society, feminists conclude that the Western economy is just as “deeply 
embedded in social (gendered) relations as the Trobriand and Tlingit economies are” 
(Wilk 1007: 19).  Their work focuses on dismantling these dualisms and re-evaluating 
many of the earlier ethnographic studies in economic anthropology and showing the 
“economic woman” in them.  The book Woman, Culture and Society (1974), edited by 
Michelle Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere, has been crucial to the development of feminist 
anthropology.  In a compilation of essays, it asks how male domination came to occur in 
many societies and how that has affected scholarship, especially in anthropology.  It 
advocates for the need to change the perception that women have always been the weaker 
sex and questions many of the presumptions about how societies are structured.  For 
example, it looks at not the nature of whether humans are naturally good or evil but 








The other major recent development in the field of economic anthropology has 
been in the area of practice theory.  Practice theory is not a cohesive theory like the 
previous theories looked at in this paper.  Instead it is a “loosely defined set of 
approaches to social theory that takes the human body to be the nexus of arrays and 
activities” (Postill 2009) that began in the late 1970s and continues through the present.   
The first generation of practice theorists sought the middle ground between 
methodological individualism, “the idea that we can explain social phenomena on the 
basis of individual actions,” and methodological holism, “the explanation of phenomena 
by means of structures or social wholes” (Postill 2009; Ryan 1970).   Pierre Bourdieu was 
the most influential of the first generation practice theorists. His later work in particular 
introduced the notion of the “field” into the vocabulary.  Fields are defined as “specialist 
domains of practice (e.g. art, photography, sociology) with their own ‘logic’ that are 
constituted by a unique combination of species of capital, e.g. financial capital, symbolic 
capital (prestige, renown) or social capital (‘connections’)” (Postill 2009).   
The second generation of practice theorists included figures like Sherry Ortner 
(1984), Andreas Reckwitz (2002), and Theodore Schatzki (2001).  Ortner defines practice 
theory as an “outgrowth of several dominant tendencies in the discipline, most 
prominently the old controversy between actor-oriented and structure-oriented 
approaches during the 1950s, and the Marxist and feminist work of the 1970s” (Eriksen 
2002: 128).  Practice theory therefore has the potential to incorporate the institutional, 






Marxist approaches of the institutional paradigm with some of the formal model building 
characteristics.  At the same time it looks at the controversies between old and new, like 
the definitions of the “economic man” discussed later.  The table below summarizes these 
two theories.  The nexus of old and new provides a variety of new topics to study, which 
can only be pursued using the multifaceted approaches discussed above.  
 
 Feminist School Practice Theory 
Major Players Michelle Rosaldo and 
Louise Lamphere 
Pierre Bourdieu, Sherry 
Ortner, Andreas Reckwitz, 
Theodore Schatzki 
Ontology The economy is rooted in 
a historically male 
dominated society.  The 
economy operates at the 
institutional level.  Society 
as a whole is patriarchal. 
The human body is the 
nexus of all activity and 
actions.  It is influenced by 
social, political and 
environmental factors. 
Epistemology Women have been placed 
on the periphery of the 
economy due to arbitrary 
association of the spheres 
of influence. 
Social phenomena can be 
explained by human actions 
and behavior. This is 
reminiscent of the Marxist 
school of thought. 
Methodology Uses ethnography and 
archaeology to re-examine 
traditional assumptions of 
gender relations, 
especially in economic 
activity. 
Utilizes formal model 
building of the formalist 
paradigm. 
Figure 7 – Summary table for the feminist school of thought and practice theory. 
 
Both the feminist school of thought and practice theory combined some 
epistemological, ontological, and methodological elements of earlier paradigms.  In doing 
so, they created new levels of understanding of those paradigms and the issues at hand 
(see table above).  Many of the topics studied by economic anthropologists today use this 






this multifaceted approach has enabled such figures as Scot Cook, David Kaplan, and 
Harold Schneider to examine the definition of the economic man in new light.  
 
The “Economic Man” 
 The term “economic man” has been so thoroughly absorbed into the vocabulary 
of economic anthropology that there are few references to where it originally appeared.  
Some claim that it originated in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776) (Rutherford 
2007: 106).  Others claim that is was in fact Stuart Mill that first came up with the idea of 
the economic man in his 1836 paper “On the Definition of Political Economy, and on the 
Method of Investigation Proper to It” (though he did not use the term in it) (Mill 1836; 
Persky 1995).   Regardless of where the term originated, its definition has gone through 
several permutations over time. 
 The elements of the economic man described by Smith in The Wealth of Nations 
that were later echoed by Mill in his essay were: 
• Man desires to possess more than the necessities. 
• Man desires wealth, conveniences and luxuries. 
• Man is capable and willing to do whatever is necessary to obtain his desires with 
the least amount of work possible. 
 
• Man will act rationally in his own self-interest. 
 For both Smith and Mill, these qualifications applied to institutional economies (Persky: 
224).  They both relied on the presence of a market economy with a market exchange 
mechanism.  It was not until the twentieth century that economists attempted to apply this 






This can be seen in Albert Ernest Jenks’ paper “Economic Man – A Definition” from 
1902.  His definition for the economic man as “one who, for future gain, produces or 
traffics in consumable goods” (202) contrasted to the idea of a “natural man.”  Jenk’s 
economic man, therefore has three central components:  
• He must produce consumable goods. 
• He must traffic consumable goods. 
• The production and traffic must be for future gain.   
Future gain, as defined by Jenks, means “a gain of more than is necessary to continue life 
at the same level (Jenks 1902: 202).  On the level of a “primitive” society (such as the 
one Jenks was looking at), production would have been agriculture or zoöculture.  
Traffic, similarly, would have been the precursor to commerce.  Despite Jenks’ 
application of the term to “primitive” societies, his definition retained some key elements 
from Smith and Mill. In particular, his definition of future gain aligns with Mill’s notion 
that man wants more than the basic necessities, including commodities and luxuries.  
Jenks ignores the philosophy behind the wants and desires of the economic man, 
however, and focuses instead on the practical requirements of one.  In this way, he is able 
to avoid the market exchange mechanism upon which Mill and Smith rely.  
 Both of these definitions of the economic man are grounded in classical economic 
theory.  They also utilize the same epistemologies as the institutional paradigm and the 
political economy school of thought (see Figure 3).  These definitions rely on the 
assumptions that there are patterns and trends in society and that those patterns can be 
discovered.  At the same time, these definitions acknowledge the variety of economies 






Depending on which form existed in a given society, the economy would be more or less 
embedded.  As such, the application of the economic man to a given society depended on 
which form of economy the definition included.  
 Beginning in the 1920s and continuing through the 1960s, the “economic man” 
took on the vocabulary of “maximizing his gains” (Cohen 1967: 92) or “maximizing his 
satisfaction” (Firth).  These draw upon the theme of scarcity and allocation of resources 
as utilized by economic anthropologists.  The focus shifted away from requiring the 
market mechanism of Mill and Smith.  Yet it also rejected Jenks’, and to some degree 
Malinowski’s (See Cohen 1967), notion that men in “primitive” societies were driven by 
social structures and environmental constraints. Raymond Firth was one of the leading 
scholars in this shift.  His basic assumptions for the economic man were (Cohen 1967: 
93; Firth 1939: 1-31, 352-365): 
• All men in all societies are faced with the same economic problem: how to 
allocate resources between alternate uses 
• Some uses are valued more highly than others 
Such assumptions opened non-industrial societies to the same analysis of economic 
patterns as industrial societies.  Proponents of this definition of the economic man 
generally sided with the formal paradigm and school of thought in economics.  They 
tested the assumptions of Firth and other anthropologists like him against the empirical 
data they collected from fieldwork.  More often than, not this was in non-industrial 
societies.  In the 1960s and 70s, the results of such comparisons led to a debate about 






This debate mirrored the formalist-substantivist debate that occurred in the rest of 
anthropology.  At the same time, it arose in part out of critiques of the neoclassical 
paradigm by proponents of the new institutional paradigm.  David Kaplanxxi, in an 
exchange with Scott Cookxxii, critiqued the ability of economic theory, particularly 
microeconomic theory (from which the “economic man” is derived), to be applied cross-
culturally.  According to Kaplan, microeconomic theory is so idealized that it has 
difficulty deciding which reality it should apply to.  In other words, it relies so heavily on 
assumptions like 2 + 2 = 4 that it is no longer grounded in solving practical economic 
problems (Schneider 1974: 180).  He argues that theories based off of assumptions, when 
given empirical content with which to test, have “proved to be limited to market-
organized societies” (Schneider 1974: 180; Kaplan 1968).   
This applies to the assumptions of the economic man as well.  In order to be 
termed an economic man, the subject must be proved empirically to have shown desire to 
maximize utility.  They cannot be assumed to desire to maximize utility (i.e. be rational).  
In order to do so, identification of key components that show the maximization must be 
bounded by rules (Schneider 1974:180; Kaplan 1968).  These rules will not be the same 
for an industrial and non-industrial society.  Thus, economic theory that applies to an 
industrial society cannot apply to a non-industrial society. 
Cook retorted “there are no rules for the application of theory to the real world” 
(Schneider 1974: 180).  The researcher, who as a human being makes assumptions, must 
decide the application of rules to reality.  Thus, the validity of the methods of testing the 
rules and assumptions of the economic man are determined by trying them.  At the heart 






institutional, industrial society defines maximization of utility is not necessarily the same 
as how a non-industrial society does. 
Schneider gives a good example of such differences in his book Economic Man 
(1974).  In the 1950s the British colonial government in Tanganyika had to deal with the 
problem of soil erosion on most of the better farming lands in the area.  This was 
ascribed, according to Schneider, to “overgrazing by African livestock raisers” (214).  
Their solution was to require each homestead to reduce the number of livestock it owned 
by 10%.  It was thought that the farmers, the Turu, were not economic men because their 
economy did not function within the same constructs as a European economy.  The initial 
plan did not work because most households had fewer than ten “bovine units,” and were 
thus exempt from the new rule.  As a result, the British government decided to increase 
the destocking rate to 15% (in 1956), which only increased the gap between the rich and 
the poor. 
The British government tried to impose an economical solution designed to deal 
with a “non-economical” aspect of the Turu society.  Since the Turu did not consider and 
treat cattle according to the same economic principles that the British were familiar with, 
they were not economical.  To the British, it appeared “the Turu kept livestock, and 
particularly cattle, more as pets than as economic assets” (215).  The cattle were not 
milked or eaten regularly nor were they well fed. Instead they were employed in ancestral 
sacrifices (215).  In fact, livestock in Turu society, as Schneider points out, are a form of 
commodity that acts as a type of currency.  The farmer that raises grain does so to 
exchange it for cattle (216), which he will then trade for something else.  The 15% 






both the cattle and the grain.  By lowering the supply of cattle by 15%, the British 
government also lowered the value of the grain, which decreased the number and 
frequency of such exchanges.  
Such differences in the understanding of indigenous versus western economies led 
to numerous cases of failed economies in developing countries during colonialism.  There 
was little room in economic anthropology for the application of the economic man at this 
time to indigenous cultures.  In particular, the definition of the economic man did not 
allow room for a cross-cultural application.  It was not until after the Cook-Kaplan debate 
that the economic man came to be defined more cross-culturally.  Part of this was due to 
research by anthropologists like Harold Schneider who, in their ethnographic research, 
looked specifically at the different types of economies that existed under colonial rule.   
In addition to such ethnographic work, the broadening of the definition of the 
economic man has been helped by the numerous reexaminations of the term, especially in 
the last thirty years.  Scholars like Harvey Leibenstein (1976), David Marsden (1986), 
Marianne Ferber and Julie Nelson (1993), Joseph Persky (1995), Harry Blair (1971), and 
Raphael Sassower (2010), among others, have sought to reexamine how homo 
economicus is defined and what characterizes him, including how gender is assigned (see 
Ferber and Nelson 1993).  More recent examinations (see Sassower 2010; Landa and 
Wang 2001) have looked particularly at how the rationality of the economic man is more 
of a “bounded rationality” and how it is connected to behavioral and social factors of the 
economy.  In other words, these examinations are embedding the economic man’s actions 






This embedding of the economic man makes him more directly applicable, not 
only to non-western societies, but also to lower classes in societies that do not necessarily 
operate within the institutional economy.  Some of these people may operate within an 
informal economy or gray market, like hawala, yet still behave in an economic manner.  
Such an application of the economic man utilizes the proletariat focus of much of the 
Marxist school of thought.   Yet by stating that the environment influences the decisions 
of the economic man, scholars like Landa and Wang are also drawing upon the 
epistemology of the ecological paradigm.  Finally, by examining the gender history of the 
term, Ferber and Nelson are able to apply the feminist school of thought’s epistemology 
to the concept. 
As can be seen, the definition and concept of the economic man has become 
increasingly cross-cultural and multi-faceted in its definition and application since its 
origins in the 18th century.  It started out as a male figure that acts in self-interest, driven 
to accumulate wealth, luxuries, and commodities according to western standards.  Since 
then it has developed into any person that acts according to what will help them 
“maximize their satisfaction” or “utility.”  This means that their actions could be 
determined not only by what will bring them profit, but also by what the environmental, 
social, and ecological constraints are on them.  Additionally, this definition can be 
applied to any type of society and any class within it. 
 
Conclusion 
 Economic Anthropology started out as a tied to the classic economic theory of 






questions of human nature and how that applied to human behavior.  Are humans 
inherently good or evil?  Are they naturally selfish or selfless?  Does their behavior 
reflect this? These philosophical questions guided the first generations of economists like 
Adam Smith and Stuart Mills, from whose work the founding figures of economic 
anthropology would take the ideas of the “economic man” and the embedded economy.  
Bronislaw Malinowski, Max Weber, Thornstein Veblen, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx 
laid the foundations for economic anthropology in their fieldwork and theoretical 
contributions to what the field should believe.   
This paper looked at the contributions of these and other scholars to the field of 
economic anthropology in terms of both the history of ideas and the philosophy of 
science.  It looked at the three major paradigms institutional, formal, and ecological that 
have guided the field to be more cross-cultural in its scholarship.  It also looked at the 
various schools of thought and theories that influenced this transition.  These included the 
Marxist and feminist schools of thought and the dependency, world systems, and practice 
theories.  The paradigms, schools of thought, and theories all influenced each other and 
drew upon ideas and concepts of the others, particularly in more recent years.  It is this 
sharing of ideas that has led to the cross-cultural, multi-faceted approach that is found 
today in economic anthropology.  There is no one universal paradigm that dominates the 
field.  Rather, each scholar picks and chooses elements of all the paradigms and theories 
according to what they believe.  Sometimes this places them solidly in one school or 
paradigm, other times it does not. 
The same is true for the idea of the “economic man.”  When it first originated, its 






field of economic anthropology have been reflected in the changing definitions of the 
term.  This change is most apparent in the definition that is used now, which can be 
applied to any economy and class of society.  It is not gender-dominated (as much) and it 
allows for the influence of the environment, social and political aspects of a given culture 
on the economy and thus on the individual. 
Given this cross-cultural trend in the field, I would expect economic anthropology 
to continue to develop and expand into new avenues incorporating elements of other 
disciplines like psychology into its theories.  Through this process of increasingly 
encompassing more of the elements of a culture, economic anthropology is moving more 
away from economics and more towards the general study of the culture.  While this 
opens up some new avenues of study, like the application of the economic man to the 
informal economy, it also takes the focus off of the monetary aspects of the discipline.  It 
will be interesting to see how economic theory will continue to be applied in this context 
and whether or not it will also undergo more change to better fit the new cross-cultural 
discipline of economic anthropology. 
 
I pledge on my honor that I have neither given nor received any unauthorized 
assistance on this assignment. 
Appendix 1: Tree of Intellectual Thought Organized by Date
 
Figure 8 – Some of the influential figures in the history of economic anthropology 
arranged according to intellectual influence.  This is not an encompassing tree as not 
every scholar has a direct intellectual influence.  Rather than have a muddled, 
convoluted tree, this tree depicts those who have a clear intellectual influence on 
others in the discipline.  Scholars not listed on this tree have also made a significant 












Appendix 2: Book Reviews
 
Economies and Cultures Book Review 
 
 
Introduction and Synopsis 
 
 Richard Wilk and Lisa Cliggett’s Economies and Cultures: Foundations of 
Economic Anthropology (2007) is a textbook for economic anthropology that is meant 
for upper level undergraduate students and beginning graduate students.  Wilk and 
Cliggett (W & C) present an ample appendix of additional sources and supplements that 
would be used by the professor of economics anthropology.  It aims to give a broad 
overview of the issues in the field of economic anthropology by looking at three models 
of human nature that dictate three “fundamental approaches to human behavior” (Wilk 
2007: 140).  They argue that in regard to human behavior and motivation, most 
approaches only look at one of the three above while ignoring the common elements 
between them.  They conclude by suggesting that it is possible to create a school of 
thought that deals with all three, in a hybrid form, in order to examine human behavior in 
relation to the economies.   
 
Analysis 
Introducing the entirety of a field in a book that is less than three hundred pages is 
an ambitious goal.  W & C have done a good job in creating a textbook is a useful 
introductory look at the theories and issues of economic anthropology.  It uses a 
simplistic and easy to relate to style of writing and gives a fairly comprehensive overview 






be difficult to follow for someone not familiar with the field and without turning to 
additional sources. 
Many textbooks aim to state the issues as eloquently as possible, often at the cost 
of the student’s ability to understand the underlying concepts.  W & C make a conscious 
attempt to simplify the language of this book to make it easier to get at the major 
concepts in the field.  This makes the book a good resource for students who are just 
beginning to look into the field of economic anthropology, and at the same time includes 
the most important terms that people are likely to come across. 
As an introduction to the field of economic anthropology, W & C try to simplify 
the paradigms and present things as clear-cut as possible.  They chose to do so by looking 
at the field through the lens of three different models of human nature: moral, selfish, and 
self-interested.  They situate the major paradigms and players within one or more of these 
lens beginning with the formalist-substantivist debate in field.  As a result, they present a 
snapshot of each paradigm and its major players, presenting both some benefits and 
critics of each one.  These snapshots are very useful, although in some cases they do not 
provide sufficient information.   
For example, when W & C look at the origins of economic anthropology, they 
focus on the contributions of Adam Smith and David Ricardo whom they term the 
founders of economics (pp. 51-57).  Yet they gloss over some of the major contributions 
of the next generation of Thornstein Veblen and Richard Thurnwald in the development 
of economic anthropology.  Similarly, their presentation of Marxist economic 
anthropology is more critical and short than it could be, and their discussion of the work 






(Pg. 24).  In some ways, W & C compensates for these deficiencies by stating in his 
introduction that this book is meant to be supplemented by additional readings and 
discussions by the professor (Pp. 199-207).  Unfortunately, for the student that decides to 
read this outside the realm of a structured class, this makes the book both too superficial 
in some areas and difficult to navigate as a whole.   
 Textbooks are often structured by overarching themes, however, such a structure 
only works when the reader is sufficiently familiar with the themes presented and the 
subjects fit distinctly within the themes.  Rather than spend a chapter on each paradigm 
and issue in economic anthropology, W & C decided to look at them within the structure 
of the three approaches to human nature described above.  As a student reading this text 
outside of the atmosphere of a structured class, such an organization is more difficult to 
navigate and in some cases more confusing than a more straightforward one would be.  
The book lends itself to being read in pieces not necessarily in the order in which they 
were placed and at times seems to be making several different arguments.  Within each 
section W & C first try to describe the major points of the paradigm or issue and second 
to orient it within one of the three approaches to human behavior.  Lastly, they try to 
present some critics of the paradigm and argue for a more cross-cultural approach to the 
discipline.  These three arguments at sometimes serve cross-purposes and can confuse the 
reader as to what the intention is. 
 
Conclusion 
 As a textbook for upper level undergraduate or new graduate students, this could 






discipline have a broader application to the field of anthropology, which can be most 
clearly understood in his last few chapters.  It would have been helpful, in my opinion, to 
more clearly discuss the role of the human behavior models in each paradigm.  Another 
option would have been to relegate a discussion of them to a single chapter.  In either 
case, the book would be simpler to navigate and understand the concepts.  Despite the 
difficulty in navigation this book, Wilk and Cliggett do a good job of providing the reader 
with a good foundation in the field of economic anthropology.  I found this to be a 
worthwhile read, especially in the context of a research project that would give me access 






A History of Anthropology Book Review 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Finn Sivert Nielsen’s A History of Anthropology (2001) is 
an attempt to present a “sober and balanced account” (vii) of the history of anthropology.  
It is organized chronologically beginning with the Greeks and ending with the 1990s.  
Overall, it is a very good overview of the history of anthropology and does a good job of 
presenting the major theories and debates in the field in a “balanced” and “sober” way.  
Yet it does not adequately address the institutional developments in the field, nor are all 
of the intellectual genealogies always correct.  Additionally, despite the fact that the 
authors are Swedish, they present only the limited discussion of the history of French, 




 The chronology of the book starts in Chapter 1 with how the ancient Greeks 
understood the “other” and how that developed into universalism and relativism.  
Universalism looks for the “commonalities and similarities between different societies” 
(2), whereas relativism looks at each society as being unique and incomparable.  E & N 
connect the universalist vs. relativist debate with the empiricist vs. rationalist and 
methodological individualism vs. collectivism debates discussed later in the chapter.  To 
do so, they look at the impacts of European conquests, colonialism, the Enlightenment 
and the Voltaire-Herder debate.  
 Chapter 2 focuses on social evolutionism, diffusionism and the development of 
continental sociology.  They especially look at the theoretical contributions of Karl Marx, 
Emile Durkheim and Max Weber to anthropology.  From there E & N move in Chapter 3 






Franz Boas, Bronislaw Malinowski, Alfred Radcliffe-Brown, and Marcel Mauss.  They 
pay particular attention to the similarities and differences in the French, American and 
British schools of thought.   
Chapter 4 looks at the formation of the first university departments at Oxford, the 
London School of Economics, Columbia and Chicago.  They focus on the trends 
developed by the students of each figure.  These include the “culture and personality” 
theory, the Chicago school, and the influence of kinship studies (like that of Evans-
Pritchard) on ethnographic research.  In addition, they briefly discuss the work of the 
British “outsiders” A.M. Hocart, S. Nadel, and G Bateson. 
The next five chapters clearly and concisely set out the development of 
anthropology, particularly focusing on the major theoretical debates.  They argue that it is 
these debates intertwined anthropology with other disciplines like sociology.  They also 
claim that each debate added to the theoretical depth of the field.  Chapters 5 and 6 
outline the debates and the theoretical positions taken.  Among those discussed are the 
formalist-substantivist debate, methodological individualism and systems theory.  
Though time is also spent looking at the parallels between the work of the Manchester 
school and that of Chicago. 
The last three chapters (7, 8 and 9) look at the more recent developments in the 
field of anthropology beginning in the 1970s and ending in the 1990s.  They concentrate 
on the Marxist, feminist, and postmodernist critics of the discipline in Chapters 7 and 8, 
and look at the responses and changes in the field as a result in Chapter 9.  Marxist and 
postmodernist critics dealt primarily with the notion of “us” versus “them.” They were 






critiques were echoed by the feminists and tied in with the dichotomy between what is 
modern and what is traditional in society. 
The major change discussed in Chapter 9 is the lack of an “us” versus “them” 
debate currently in the field.  Instead, there is a growing debate between “biology” versus 
“culture.” Such a debate requires a careful examination of cognitive anthropology, 
Darwinist social theory and evolutionary psychology.  The last part of the chapter looks 




 E & N do a good job of presenting the material in a balanced and sober way, 
without bringing in their biases anywhere.  Where the book is lacking is in its treatment 
of the recent institutional developments in the field, its occasional inaccuracies, and the 
limited scope of the history of anthropology it deals with. 
 With the plethora of recent graduates in the field of anthropology every year it 
would be a formidable task to summarize all of their work in the context of this book.  
Yet E & N almost entirely ignore the most recent institutional developments in the field.  
That is to say that they ignore the changes in how the discipline is constructed and the 
types of jobs being pursued.  Many graduates today do not go into ethnography; instead 
they go into applied anthropology or academia.   
It would have been very interesting to have a brief discussion of the shift in the 
context from which the new theoretical debates are arising.  The debates discussed in this 
book arose from the interactions and context in which those scholars were working.  It 
would be very helpful and useful to have an examination of what has changed and why, 






Although most of the information is presented in a very clear and helpful way, 
there are some inaccuracies that undermine the rest of the book.  For example, James 
George Frazer (1854-1941) may have been in the same intellectual vein as Tylor, but he 
was not a ‘student’ of his (25).  Little details such as this can be confusing and 
misleading.  It is not incorrect to say that Frazer was influenced by Tylor’s work. Nor is it 
incorrect to say that he is an intellectual descendant of Tylor.  Such inaccuracies diminish 
the reliability of the book as a whole.  Any information gotten from it must be checked 
using other sources. 
As Swedish anthropologists, E & N have access to a side of the history of 
anthropology that is not typically studied.  Yet they decided to focus on the three primary 
branches of anthropology: the French, British, and American.  It would have been very 
interesting to see how these three influenced the development of anthropology in place 
like Sweden.  
Conclusion
 
 Despite the critiques discussed above, A History of Anthropology (2001) by 
Eriksen and Nielsen is a useful resource for anyone looking for a concise and unbiased 
history of the field.  In this context, the limited scope of the book and inaccuracies do not 
undermine the usefulness of the information being presented.  It is well worth a read, 
especially as an introduction to the broad scope of theoretical debates that have arisen in 
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i The idea of “maximization” in part comes from Marvin Harris.  Maximization applies 
mostly to the concept of the economic man, who is said to “maximize” his satisfaction by 
attaining material goods or profit. Particularly his work on the meaning of India’s sacred 
cow demonstrates how in an economy outside the west, maximization of utility or 
satisfaction can take on new meaning.  In some respects, it is similar to the work of 
Harold Schneider on the Turu in Tanzania (see Schneider 1974). 
 
ii Richard Wilk is a professor of Anthropology at the University of Indiana who has 
worked mostly in Belize.  “His initial research on the cultural ecology of farming and 
family organization was followed by work on consumer culture and sustainable 
consumption, energy consumption, globalization, television, beauty pageants and food. 
Much of his recent work has turned towards the history of food, the linkages between 
tourism and sustainable development, and the origin of modern masculinity.” 
(http://indiana.academia.edu/RichardWilk)  
 
iiiLocke and Rousseau were not self defined “economists.”  Locke’s influence lies in his 
theory of Supply and Demand, which would be picked up by Karl Polanyi and the 
difference between institutional versus tribal economies. Rousseau’s influence is in his 
theories on the natural state of man influenced the work of Adam Smith and much later, 
Karl Polanyi.   
 
iv Here I am using “primitive” to illustrate how indigenous and third world populations 
were characterized through colonialism.  I am not using it to describe these cultures as 
less advanced or less human.  Accordingly, whenever the word is used, I will indicate this 
distinction by using quotation marks. 
 
v This type of classification of human behavior is generally associated with the “self-
interested” model of behavior.  The individual is interested in maximizing their material 
gains.  Thus while their behavior may seem unselfish, there is usually an ulterior motive 
behind it that benefits them. 
 
vi The idea of “moral imagination” is often used in the “moral” model of behavior, 
although Weber himself tried to combine it with several of the models above.  The moral 
model is based on the idea that each culture has a cosmology, which guides the behavior 
of the individuals.  The way that moral values flow from one generation to the next forms 
a type of cultural economy that can then be studied. 
 
vii Unlike the “self-interested” model, this approach is more associated with the “social” 
model.  According to this model, people identify with a group and the interests of that 
group will motivate their actions.  This is the basis of the approach of political economy, 







                                                                                                                                                 
viii The “economy” at this time was defined entirely in terms of technology.  For example, 
the kula exchange between the Trobriand Islanders studied by Malinowski was not 
considered an economic exchange.  It was not based in the system of value determined by 
money and other technologies. 
 
ix General reciprocity is characterized by the act of giving away goods without 
expectations of receiving something in return.  Examples of this include gift giving or 
ritual distribution of wealth.  First used by Marshall Sahlins in Stone Age Economics, 
there is also balanced reciprocity and negative reciprocity.  Balanced reciprocity involves 
an equal exchange of goods, such as the barter system, or gray market and still has a 
moral dimension.  Who the barter is with and the type of goods exchanged depends on 
the group affiliations and moral imaginations of the individuals involved.  Negative 
reciprocity involves an exchange of goods without the benefit of the moral dimension.  
The best example of this is with supply and demand.  The price is determined not by the 
relation of the buyer to the seller but on what the market will bear. 
 
x Even while Firth argued that the economy was embedded (see Firth 1952: 153), he 
maintained a formalist position when the formalist-substantivist debate arose.  Similarly, 
Herskovits maintained a subtantivist approach, while trying to show that economic theory 
could be applied cross-culturally.  The two positions, as Wilk indicates are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather form a dialectic relationship.  Anthropologists that side with one 
viewpoint often incorporated aspects of the other despite their strong opinions. 
 
xi Herskovits’ theories on the applicability of economic theory in conjunction with his 
embedding of cultural systems relied on a methodology based on the analysis of facts and 
only facts.  An economist, Frank Knight, challenged Herskovits’ methodology in the 
1950s saying that “any intelligent or useful exposition of facts imperatively requires an 
understanding of principles, while the need for facts in connection with the exposition of 
principles is far more tenuous” (1952: 516).  Their debate was essentially one of an 
inductivist versus a deductivist approach to science (see section on the formal paradigm 
for more on deduction vs. induction). 
 
xii While formalists did believe that economic theories could be applied to economic 
anthropology, the formalism that Karl Polanyi wrote about was a concealed critique of 
capitalism. 
 
xiii In this case maximization refers only to the economic rationality of a decision. 
 
xiv I use the term “neo” here to convey the fact that while the Marxism of the 1970s had 
its foundations in Karl Marx’s original writings, it was a new look at it.  They drew 
mostly from Marx’s early writings and adapted them to a variety of causes, which Marx 
would probably have ignored. 
 
xv For more information on the misuse of and confusion surrounding the term “formal” 






                                                                                                                                                 
 
xvi It is for this reason that some critics have said that Godelier’s work is more in line with 
structural functionalism than it is with economic anthropology. 
 
xvii Meillassoux along with Emmanuel Terray and Pierre-Philippe Rey are the intellectual 
descendants Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar – the “fathers” of structural Marxist 
thought. As the name implies, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structural-functionalism contributed 
some to the intellectual material as well.  Godélier initially tried to apply Lévi-Strauss’s 
structures to structural Marxist economic anthropology. He advocated “Marxism can add 
a specific kind of function to Lévi-Strauss’s structures, thereby allowing a complete 
anthropological analysis of social systems” (Hart 1983: 124). Unfortunately, in practice 
this resulted in something very much like cultural ecology instead of Marxism. 
 
xviii There are many different definitions of the term “formal.”  The original definition 
comes from Weber and meant “quantifiable.”  Another definition from marginal utility 
economics assumed that all people were self-interested maximisers responding to forces 
of supply and demand.  Frank Knight used yet another definition of formal as “ideal”.  
Generally the definition used in the formal paradigm is Frank Knight’s (Halperin 1988: 
60, 73; Knight 1952: 510-6).  Polanyi’s formal approach is more a masked critique of 
capitalism in substantivist analysis (Halperin 1988:65). 
 
xix Herskovits is not a formalist in the sense of Polanyi’s “formalists.” Yet his ideas on the 
maximization of satisfaction have been applied to the formal paradigm within economic 
anthropology that focuses on model building.   
 
xx Here I am distinguishing between the use of “formal” in Polanyi’s definition of “formal 
versus substantive” and the use of “formal” in formal model building and the formal 
paradigm.  The former was defined solely to contrast the substantive approach that 
Polanyi’s proposed.  While it did utilize much of the formal paradigms model building 
theory, it was not meant to be synonymous with it.  The latter was defined as described 
on pages 19-20 of this paper.  It had its own ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological beliefs that made it unique from other paradigms. 
 
xxi  Kaplan favored the deductivist method of analysis, which was in line with the 
formalist paradigm and classical economics. 
 
xxii While Scott Cook was a formalist, he did not see the same problems that Kaplan saw 
with the inductive method of analysis.  For example, his proposed solution follows the 
new institutional paradigm particularly in how it relates theory to reality.  For more see 
Cook 1969. 
